Software Vault: The Gold Collection/Software Vault - The Gold Collection (American Databankers) (1993).ISO/cdr12/cud535.zip/CUD535.TXT

Text File | 1993-05-13 | 40KB | 870 lines

Computer underground Digest    Wed May 12 1993   Volume 5 : Issue 35
                           ISSN  1004-042X

       Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer ([e-mail])
       Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
       Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
                          Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
                          Ian Dickinson
       Copy Editor: Etaoin Shrdlu, Senrio

CONTENTS, #5.35 (May 12 1993)
File 1--My Thoughts/questions on the "Clipper" chip.
File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter on Clipper Chip
File 3--Response to Rich Mackinnon on Clipper
File 4--Another Letter of Concern to "Hate Speech" Inquiry
File 5--FBI Raids Telco Manager's Home (TELECOM DIGEST SPECIAL)
File 6--DEF CON I Update

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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 22:10:03 CDT
From: Eric Schnoebelen <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 1--My Thoughts/questions on the "Clipper" chip.

I've seen a lot of hoopla on the "Clipper" chip that the (U.S.)
government recently announced, and I am not entirely certain what to
make of it.

I'm a little suspicious of the intent, as well as those who created it
(who exactly did?).

But, what I am more concerned about is the exportability of it, and
how it is going to become a "world-wide" standard, which it will need
to do, if it is to become accepted at all.  The U.S.  is no longer the
center of the universe, and U.S.  companies cannot afford to make two
products, one for distribution in the U.S., and one outside.  If
forced to choose, many will choose to build the "international"
version exclusively.

Another concern is the lack of a description of the algorithm.  The
algorithm is needed if there are to be software implementations, and
software implementations are sorely needed.

I ask because I have been struggling with trying to get the NSA's last
encryption algorithm, the Data Encryption Standard, exported when used
for authentication.  Our interpretation is that we cannot export any
form of user accessible routine that implements DES, not even a
crippled edition of crypt(3), which can do only password
authentication.  Needless to say, this has caused much concern amongst
our European distributors and customers.

We have spent the last two years trying to get an answer from the
Department of Commerce about the legality of exporting a crippled
version of crypt(3), which can do only authentication, and gotten
basically no where.  We were finally given the names of a couple of
folks inside the NSA, but we're almost afraid to talk to them...

If the "Clipper" chip is to be viable, it cannot have these sorts of
problems hanging over it.  The algorithms need to be publicly know,
and implemented, and no export restrictions placed upon either the
chip or the software.  Otherwise, it is worse than useless.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 11 May 93 17:11:42 -0700
From: Russell Brand <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 2--Response to Jerry Leichter on Clipper Chip

In CU Digest 5.34, Jerry Leichter <[e-mail]> attacked Mike
Godwin's position on the open design principle.

While  Leichter is correct that in certain environments, an %open
design' is fact neither partical nor appropriate.  CLIPPER is doesn't
present an instance of this.  One of the reasons that an open design
is important is so that you don't have to worry what advantage someone
can get by stealing it.  Because the a well tested is system is
supposedly intrinsically strong, you are unlikely to have to replace
MILLIONS of them in the field because of a person being single bribed
to betray some of the secrets.  [Of course in the CLIPPER system there
are other people to bribe instead and even if CLIPPER had open design
there would be other strong reasons to oppose it.]

If CLIPPER is commonly used to protect corporate secrets what is the
logical bribe price?  I bet it is more than enough to buy a mere
government secret but that it isn't enough to quickly factor an
product of a pair of well chosen 1000 digit primes.
Date: Tue, 11 May 1993 11:13:41 -0400
From: Mike Godwin <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 3--Response to Rich Mackinnon on Clipper

In article <[e-mail]> [e-mail] (Rich
Mackinnon of the University of Texas government department )writes:

>How much will the crippled encryption scheme really "chill" our use of
>emergent communications technology, i.e., threaten our free speech protection
>to the point that we may opt (if possible) to use other communication
>media?

The fact that it's an emergent medium increases the risk that it can be
chilled. But note that the risk of a "chilling effect" is only one small
part of my argument, and not a necessary part. Far more disturbing is the
increase in the government's power to tell me what *general* forms I'm
allowed to use when I communicate.

>The threat of a warrant does not seem to have a wide chilling
>effect on the use of standard telephones and postal mail--yet, the possibility
>of interception is still ever-present.

The use of telephones and mail was already a fait accompli when wiretapping
became widespread. There was no chance that wiretapping would chill an
emerging technology. Moreover, the character of e-mail is somewhat
different from that of telephonic communications--it's less ephemeral and
more "broadcastable." That is, it's easier to store and echo to large
groups of people. (In comparison, it's somewhat more difficult to tape a
voice conversation and echo it to the world.)

What's more, encryption is likely to increase the expectation of privacy
with regard to e-mail and all other communications that are encrypted.

>Does not the warrant sufficiently address this balance?

If you are asking whether we should rely on the search-warrant process to
protect our privacy when we have access to encryption, my answer is
"Why rely on the government to do what you can do yourself?"

>If the protection that a warrant offers is not
>sufficient to alleviate our fears of unwarranted search, seizure, and arrest,
>then perhaps there are bigger problems to deal with other than encryption
>schemes.

Perhaps there are, but an individual does not have to ask the legislature
for permission to use encryption. Not yet, at any rate. So, encryption
enables an individual to tackle his own privacy problem without having to
lobby for a change in the warrant process. Most theorists would regard
this as empowering to the individual.

>I'm nowhere near as qualified as Mike to offer an opinion on this issue,
>but it seems to me that the "process" is exactly where we should be
>focusing--the Constitutional issues are fascinating, but distracting.

Sigh. The Constitutional issues will be the only ones we are left with.
Imagine that we have improved the process and had lots of dialog with the
Administration, and the Clipper initiative remains the result. If the
process is wonderful and the result is bad, does this mean we have nothing
to criticize the government about?

>I have to believe that the warrant is an acceptable safeguard to both
>sides of the balance.  Given that, it appears that the balance has been
>disturbed by an unilateral decision with respect to the Clipper Chip.

This is a very charitable picture of the government's mistake, Rich.
You seem to be saying that if the decision had been other than
"unilateral," the government's decision would be unimpeachable. I beg to
differ. The whole point of the Bill of Rights is to remove certain rights
from political debate. As Melville Nimmer comments, a "balancing" test is
never adequate to protect freedom of speech. As it stands, we have the
freedom to say things to each other in secret (through encryption). Must
we surrender this right to the government once the process gets better?

> The
>plan presented by the Clinton Administration, as far as attempting to
>balance the concerns of government and the people, seems sound.

The problem is that the plan "balances" the concerns of government in the
direction of government. Many people have been critical of the
government's insistence that being able to guarantee access to private
communications is the cornerstone of law enforcement. No study of law
enforcement I know of supports this view.

>This is a political problem in that a practical solution is available, but
>cannot be agreed upon because the process leading to that solution did
>not allow for the necessary consultation and input to insure its acceptability.
>I'm certain that once bruised egos are attended to and future assurances
>of consultation are gained, that the solution settled upon will be very
>much like the one that stands.

This is the kind of myopia I expect from the University of Texas
Department of Government, a department that privileges process over
substance. I hope I may be forgiven for being cynical about the
willingness of government professors to sign our rights away in the name
of "good process."

It's true that, historically, government has been able to compel a
"balance" between our privacy rights and the government's often-legitimate
interests. But now we have a technology that enables us to remove our
privacy from the balancing calculation--a technology that restores the
status quo ante of the last century, when sophisticated bugging and
wiretapping technologies did not exist. I don't think the 19th-century
standard of private interpersonal communications is so threatening to
government stability as to justify mandatory government access to our
communications through Digital Telephony and Clipper.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 02:33:12 -0500
From: [e-mail](Dave Harnett)
Subject: File 4--Another Letter of Concern to "Hate Speech" Inquiry

23 Apr 93

Office of Policy Analysis and Development
NTIA, US Dept of Commerce
14th St and Constitution Ave NW
Washington, DC 20230

In response to Notice of Inquiry, Docket No. 930349-3049:

I stand qualified to respond to this inquiry by virtue of my three
years experience as the operator of a computer bulletin board and my
status as a member of three computer bulletin board networks.  In the
five years before I established my computer bulletin board, I
participated in discussion groups on other computer bulletin boards
and networks.

I harbor grave concerns regarding your inquiry, particularly your
scrutiny of a relationship between computer bulletin boards and "hate
crimes." I can summarize my position with a response to one of the
questions you pose in IV.A.13 of the Supplementary Information
section.  Governments, specifically telecommunications regulators,
have *no* proper role with respect to the content of messages carried
over telecommunications channels.

Computer bulletin boards are a truly democratic medium.  Unlike
traditional broadcast and print media, few barriers exist to preclude
an individual from exchanging ideas via computer-based
telecommunications.  The medium is a great equalizer.  In the absence
of visual and aural cues that might reveal race, religion, gender,
age, education, or disabilities, ideas become more important than the
person expressing the ideas.  Individuals are free to migrate among
discussion areas, bulletin boards, and networks, even to start their
own bulletin boards and networks in pursuit of a comfortable niche.

This community without boundaries, sometimes known as cyberspace, is
self-regulating.  I participate in a network of computer bulletin
boards that was forced to expunge a participant.  This individual
repeatedly engaged in offensive behavior.  The community treated this
individual with respect and tolerance, in the hope that our positive
attitudes could deter anti-social behavior.  Through informal means,
the community reached an consensus for action.  Sadly, some members
withdrew from the community, to protest what they perceived as
authoritarian censorship.  However, this situation keenly illustrates
that people are capable of resolving problems without interference
from government statutes and regulations.

My greatest fear is people who fear ideas, people who would use the
force of government to stifle the expression of ideas.  The legitimate
role of government is to punish not ideas, but only actions that
violate the rights of another person to life, liberty, and property.
It matters not that some groups or individuals find some ideas hateful
or offensive, or that ideas can prompt some sociopaths to commit
violent criminal acts.  Political speech can be highly offensive and
even hateful to some people.  The rhetoric of politician David Duke
comes to mind.  Historically though, the courts offer the greatest
protection to political speech.  Let us not allow the hysteria of
political correctness to compromise the principles of a free society.
If we have confidence in ourselves and our beliefs, we have nothing to
fear from the forces of intolerance and hate.

Sincerely,
David A. Harnett
Computer bulletin board - 914 452 4753
Electronic mail address - [e-mail]
USPS - PO Box 188, Poughkeepsie, NY 12602-0188

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 9 May 1993 14:59:47 -0500
From: TELECOM Moderator <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 5--FBI Raids Telco Manager's Home (TELECOM DIGEST SPECIAL)

((MODERATORS' NOTE: The following is reprinted from Telecom Digest,
available as a mailing list or a Usenet Group. For those who forget,
Pat Townson, the TD moderator, was the original impetus in the
founding of CuD)).

This news report from the May 9, 1993 %Omaha World Herald% arrived in
my mail just a few minutes ago.

PAT

  [e-mail] (James R. Saker Jr.)
  Subject--FBI Raid on Curtis Nebr. Telco, Family
  Organization--University of Nebraska at Omaha
  Date--Sun, 9 May 1993 16:34:53 GMT

The following article detailing a FBI raid on a small-town family and
local exchange carrier was printed in this morning's Sunday %Omaha
World Herald%:

"FBI Probe, Raid Anger Curtis Man"
Stephen Buttry, %Omaha World Herald%, Sunday May 9, 1993

Curtis Neb. -- The evening was winding down for the Cole family. Ed
Cole, general manager of the Curtis Telephone Co., had dozed off on
the living room couch. His wife, Carol, was running water for her
bath. The 10-year-old identical twins, Stephanie and Jennifer, had
gone to bed. Amanda, 14, was watching "48 Hours" on television in the
living room.

   "It had something to do with fingerprints and catching criminals,"
Amanda remembers of the TV show.

   At 9:40 p.m., Amanda heard a knock and answered the door. In
marched the FBI. Thus began a year of fear, anger and uncertainty for
the Coles.

   Mrs. Cole, 40, still has nightmares about the night of May 13,
1992, when federal agents stormed into her bedroom, startling her as
she was undressing for her bath, naked from the waist up.

   "I used to go to bed and sleep the whole night," she said last
week. "I can't anymore."

   Federal agents did not find the illegal wiretapping equipment they
were seeking, and a year later no one has been charged. The agents
seized nothing from the house and later returned the cassette tapes
they took from the phone company office.

   Ronald Rawalt, the FBI agent in North Platte who headed the
investigation that led to the raid, declined to comment, referring
questions to the Omaha office.

   "It's still a pending investigation, and we're not allowed to make
a statement," said agent Doug Hokenstad of the FBI's Omaha office. If
the investigation comes up empty, he said "we normally don't make a
statement at the end of the investigation."

   That infuriates Cole, 39, who says the raid cast suspicion on him
and the phone company and left them with no way to clear their names.

   "Either file charges or say there's nothing there," he said.  "This
was done in a highly visible manner, and there was no finality to it."

                       Request for Help

   Cole has asked Sen. Bob Kerrey, D-Neb., to investigate. Beth
Gonzales, Kerrey's press secretary, said the senator received Cole's
letter and is assessing the situation.

   The case that brought FBI agents from Washington, Denver, Houston
and Omaha, as well as nearby North Platte, to this tiny southwest
Nebraska town in the Medicine Creek valley apparently started with a
personnel squabble in the phone company office.

   Cole said two women complained of their treatment by two other
workers.  The women who complained threatened to quit if the company
did not take action against the other women, he said.

   Cole and his assistant manager, Steve Cole, who is not related,
observed the office workers for a while.

   "We found the same two making the ultimatum were the aggressors,"
Ed Cole said.

   He gave the complaining employees written reprimands, and they quit
Jan 16, 1992. The two women contended in a hearing concerning state
unemployment benefits that personality differences with Ed Cole led to
the reprimands and their resignations.

   Both women declined to comment on the matter.

                      300-Hertz Tone

   In an affidavit filed to obtain the search warrants, agent Rawalt
said one of the two, Carol Zak, contacted the FBI in March 1992 and
told them of "unusual electronic noises (tapping noises) on her
telephone line at the inception of a call received."

   Later in the affidavit, the noise is described not as tapping, but
as a 300-hertz tone. Steve and Ed Cole demonstrated the tone last week
on phone company equipment.

   It is caused, they said, by a defective 5-by-7 circuit board, or
card. The defect is common, and the company replaces the card if a
customer complains.

   The tone is not heard if a customer answers between rings, but if
the customer answers during a ring, the tone blares into the earpiece
for an instant, about the duration of the ring. Ed Cole, who has
placed wiretaps for law officers with warrants, said wiretaps don't
cause such a sound.

   "Most wiretaps, don't they have a loud, blasting noise to announce
there's an illegal wiretap?" he asked sarcastically.

                      Surveillance

   After Mrs. Zak told agent Rawalt of the noise on her line, the FBI
began recording her calls, the affidavit says. On April 30, the
affidavit says, the FBI began surveillance of Ed Cole -- not an easy
task in a town of 791 people.

   During the weeks before the raid, phone company employees noticed a
stranger watching the office and workers' houses. They guessed that a
private investigator was watching, possibly gathering information for
the former workers.

   "When somebody sits around in a car in a small-town Curtis,
especially at 3:30 when grade school lets out, people take notice,"
Steve Cole said. "We had a suspicion that we were under surveillance."

   The affidavit says agent Robert Howan, an electrical engineer from
FBI headquarters, analyzed tapes of Mrs. Zak's phone calls and
concluded that a wiretap on the line "is controlled from the residence
of Eddie Cole Jr. and is facilitated through a device or computer
program at the Curtis Telephone Company."

   Based on Rawalt's affidavit, U.S. Magistrate Kathleen Jaudzemis in
Omaha issued warrants to search Cole's house and company offices.
Federal agents gathered in North Platte and headed south to Curtis for
the late-evening raid.

                     Flashlights, Commotion

   When Amanda Cole opened the door, she said "The first people that
came in went past me." They rushed through the living room into the
kitchen to let more agents in the back door.

   The agents wore black jackets and raincoats, with large, yellow
letters proclaiming "FBI." Neighbors and passersby began to notice the
commotion as other agents searched the outside with flashlights.

   The agents showed Cole the search warrant and told him and Amanda
to stay in the living room. The agents asked where the other girls
were, and Cole replied that it was a school night and they were in
bed.

   Rather than flipping the hall light switch, the agents went down
the darkened hall with flashlights, "like they think my kids are going
to jump up and shoot them," Cole said.

   The twins recalled that they were puzzled, then scared, to wake up
as FBI agents shined flashlights on them. The intruders did not enter
gently, either.

   "After they left, our doorknob was broken," Jennifer said.

   Farther down the hall, the agents found the embarrassed and angry
Mrs. Cole. "They didn't knock or anything, and I was undressing," she
said. "They told me to get a T-shirt on."

   After Mrs. Cole put her clothes back on, agents allowed her to go
with them to get the frightened twins out of bed. Mrs. Cole and the
twins also were instructed to stay in the living room.

                      Interrogation

   As agents searched the house, Cole said, Rawalt told him to step
out on the porch. While he was outside, Mrs. Cole decided to call the
phone company's attorney.

   "They told me I couldn't do that," she said. "I worked at the
Sheriff's Office for several years, and I know no matter what you're
accused of, you're entitled to an attorney." She called anyway.

   Meanwhile, according to Cole, Rawalt was interrogating and berating
him loudly on the front porch, creating what Cole considered a "public
spectacle."

   "I've lived here 15 years. I've built up a reputation," said Cole,
who is president of the Curtis Housing Authority, chairman of the
Nebraska Telephone Association, and coach of the twins' softball team.
"And there's cars going by real slow. Here Rawalt brings me out on the
front porch, turn on the light for everyone to see and starts
interrogating me."

   Cole said Rawalt tried to pressure him to admit he was wiretapping
and tell him where the equipment was. "He pointed at my wife and kids
and said, 'Look at what you're putting them through,'" Cole said.

                     Three-Hour Search

   Cole said it would take about 20 minutes for an expert to examine
the phones in the house -- a teen line, the main line plus two
extensions, a 24-hour repair prone that rings at his home as well as
the main office, and an alarm that rings in from the central office.

   "The search continued for more than three hours, as agents looked
in closets, cabinets and drawers. The family could hear Garth Brooks
singing as agents played the children's tapes, apparently hunting for
recorded phone conversations.

   At the same time the Coles' house was being searched, agents
visited Steve Cole and Roger Bryant, a phone company employee who is a
neighbor of Mrs. Zak's.

   "They insinuated I had broken into my neighbor's house to put in a
wiretap," he said. The agents "asked me if I knew if Ed was making
electrical devices in his basement."

   (Cole said he wasn't. Agents found no such devices.)

   The agents told Steve Cole to take them to the phone company office
so they could search the switch room.

                    Number of Agents

   The Coles were not sure how many agents participated in the raid.
They saw at least five at the house but thought they heard others
outside and entering the back door and going into the basement. They
said seven agents were at the office, but they weren't sure which
agents searched both sites.

   When the agents said they were looking for wiretap equipment, Steve
Cole said "I told them it just couldn't be right. If Ed were to do
something or I were to do something, the other one would know."

   Steve Cole said agents searching the phone company, including
Howan, did not appear to understand the equipment very well. They
would not tell him why they suspected a wiretap.

   After 1 a.m., Ed Cole said, the search of his house ended, with
agents empty-handed and taking him to the office.

   About 4 a.m., the agents told Steve Cole about the 300-hertz tone.
"The minute they told me, I knew what it was," he said. He said he
quickly found the defective card for Mrs. Zak's line, demonstrated the
sound for the agents, then replaced it and showed that the sound was
gone.

   "I demonstrated it, and then they both got white," Steve Cole said.

                    Card Analyzed

   Howan then went to Rawalt, who was with Ed Cole outside the switch
room and explained what had caused the tone, Ed and Steve Cole said.

   "I'm jubilant," Ed Cole recalled thinking. "I've been exonerated."
But he said Rawalt told him: "I've investigated this for two months.
I've flown agents in from around the country ... I may charge you on
circumstantial evidence."

   "My heart just sunk," Cole said, "because that means they're not
here to find the truth. They're just trying to support their pre-
conceived ideas."

   He said Rawalt told him he would take the card for analysis.

   Cole said the searches could have, and should have, been conducted
without the embarrassing fanfare -- during normal business hours,
while the children were in school and his wife was at work.

   Because of the highly public nature of the raid, Cole said, the
company has hired a lawyer to investigate the investigation. The
company is trying, with little success, Cole said, to get information
from the FBI so it can reassure regulators, lenders, stockholders and
customers of the company's integrity.

                    Tapes of Calls

   Rawalt visited the Cole's house again in January. Although this
time it wasn't a raid, his presence upset the family. He returned
tapes seized in the raid but told Cole that the circuit card was
still at the FBI lab being analyzed. It still has not been returned,
Cole said.

   "The FBI, the most respected law enforcement agency in the world,
has had this card in their laboratory in Washington, D.C., for almost
one year, and they still cannot determine if it has a tape recorder
strapped to it," Cole said.

   The bureau also has refused to give the phone company of its tapes
of Mrs. Zak's phone calls, which could show whether the sound on her
line was the tone from the defective card, Cole said.

   "It makes one wonder if they'd put a family and a company through
this just because they don't want to admit a mistake," he said. "If
they'll just give me my life back by making a public statement, it
would be over."


    (End of article forwarded to TELECOM Digest.)

 Jamie Saker         [e-mail]
 Systems Engineer    Business/MIS Major
 Telenational Communications  Univ. Nebraska at Omaha
 [phone]

[Moderator's Note: Thank you very much for sending along this report.
This is just another example of the clumsy, oafish and unprofessional
organization which has become such a big joke in recent years in the
USA: The Federal Bureau of Inquisition. Imagine: a telephone line out
of order which turns into a massive FBI assault on a private family.
And of course there will be no apology; no reparations; nothing like
that. The FBI is too arrogant and powerful to bother with making
amends for the damage they have done. I hope Ed Cole and his telco
demand and obtain revenge on everyone concerned, including first and
foremost Mrs. Zak, the scorned woman who set the whole thing in motion
when she got fired for her bad attitude at work.  I know if it was
myself, I would not be content until I had turned the screws very hard
on all of them, especially her.  PAT]

------------------------------

Date:  Wed, 12 May 1993 17:00:53 PDT
From: "The Dark Tangent" <[e-mail]>
Subject: File 6--DEF CON I Update

                  D E F  C O N  I   C O N V E N T I O N

>> READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE AND READ AND DISTRIBUTE <<

                    Finalized Announcement: 5/08/1993

              We are proud to announce the 1st annual Def Con.

    If you are at all familiar with any of the previous Con's, then
you will have a good idea of what DEF CON I will be like. If you don't
have any experience with Con's, they are an event on the order of a
pilgrimage to Mecca for the underground. They are a mind-blowing orgy
of information exchange, viewpoints, speeches, education,
enlightenment... And most of all sheer, unchecked PARTYING. It is an
event that you must experience at least once in your lifetime.

    The partying aside, it is a wonderful opportunity to met some of
the celebrities of the underground computer scene. And those that
shape its destiny - the lawyers, libertarians, and most of all the
other There will be plenty of open-ended discussion on security,
telephones and other topics. As well as what TIME magazine calls the
"Cyberpunk Movement".

    Las Vegas, is as you might have guessed a great choice for the
Con.  Gambling, loads of hotels and facilities, cheap air fare and
room rates.  It's also in the West Coast making it more available to a
different crowd than the former Cons have been.

Your foray into the scene and your life will be forever incomplete if
by some chance you miss out on DEF CON I. Plan to be there!


WHO:   You know who you are.
WHAT:  Super Blowout Party Fest, with Speakers and Activities.
WHERE: Las Vegas, Nevada
WHEN:  July 9th, 10th and 11th (Fri, Sat, Sun) 1993
WHY:   To meet all the other people out there you've been talking to for
       months and months, and get some solid information instead of rumors.


DESCRIPTION:

     So you're bored, and have never gone to a convention?  You want to
meet all the other members of the so called 'computer underground'?
You've been calling BBS systems for a long time now, and you
definitely have been interacting on the national networks.  You've
bullshitted with the best, and now it's time to meet them in Vegas!
For me I've been networking for years, and now I'll get a chance to
meet everyone in the flesh.  Get together with a group of your friends
and make the journey.

     We cordially invite all hackers/phreaks, techno-rats,
programmers, writers, activists, lawyers, philosophers, politicians,
security officials, cyberpunks and all network sysops and users to
attend.

     DEF CON I will be over the weekend in the middle of down town Las
Vegas at the Sands Hotel.  Why Las Vegas?  Well the West Coast hasn't
had a  good Convention that I can remember, and Las Vegas is the place
to do it.  Cheap food, alcohol, lots of entertainment and, like us, it
never sleeps.  We will have a convention room open 24 hours so
everyone can meet and plan and scheme till they pass out.  Events and
speakers will be there to provide distraction and some actual
information and experiences from this loosely knit community.

        This is an initial announcement.  It is meant only to alert
you to the time, dates and location of the convention.  Future
announcements will inform you about specific speakers and events.

        An information pack is FTPable off of the internet at
nwnexus.wa.com, in the cd/pub/dtangent directory. The IP# is
192.135.191.1  Information updates will be posted there in the future
as well as scanned map images and updated speaker lists.

FINAL NOTES:

        COST:  How you get there is up to you, but United Airlines
will be the official carrier (meaning if you fly you get a 5% to 10%
price reduction off the cheapest available fare at the time of ticket
purchase)  When buying airline tickets, call 1-800-521-4041 and
reference meeting ID# 540ii.  Hotel Rooms will cost $62 per night for
a double occupancy room.  Get your friends together and split the cost
to $31.  Food is inexpensive.  The entertainment is free inside the
hotel.  Reference the DEF CON I convention when registering, as we
have a block of rooms locked out, but once they go it will be first
come, fist serve.  Call 1-800-634-6901 for the reservations desk.

        The convention itself will cost $30 at the door, or $15 in
advance.  It pays to register in advance! Also it helps us plan and
cover expenses!  Mail checks/money orders/cashiers checks to: DEF CON
I, 2709 East Madison Street, #102, Seattle, WA, 98112.  Make them
payable to: "DEF CON" we're not tring to make money, we will be tring
to cover costs of the conference room and hotel plus air fair for the
speakers who require it.  Don't bother mailing it a week in andvance,
that just won't happen.  Advanced registration gets you a groovy 24
bit color pre-generated name tag.  Include with your payment the name
you want listed, your association/group affiliation/bbs/whatever,
email address, and/or bbs number for sysops.  Last day for the
registrations to reach me will be July 1st.

        SPEAKERS:  We have solicited speakers from all aspects of the
computer underground and associated culture (Law, Media, Software
Companies, Cracking Groups, Hacking Groups, Magazine Editors, Etc.)
If you know of someone interested in speaking on a self selected
topic, please contact The Dark Tangent to discuss it.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

        For initial comments, requests for more information, information
about speaking at the event, or maps to the section where prostitution is
legal outside Las Vegas (Just Kidding) Contact The Dark Tangent by leaving
me mail at: [e-mail] on the InterNet.

Or call: 0-700-TANGENT for conference information/updates and to leave
         questions or comments.
Or Snail Mail (U.S. Postal Service) it to DEF CON, 2709 East Madison Street,
#102, Seattle, WA, 98112.

Future information updates will pertain to the speaking agenda.

++++++++++++++++++++++
Updates since the last announcement:

>> The Secret Service is too busy to attend.
>> New Media Magazine, Unix World and Robert X. Cringly have stated they will
   attend.
>> We got a voice mail system working (I think) for comments and questions.
>> We don't have enough $$$ to fly out the EFF or Phillip Zimmerman (Author
   of PGP) or Loyd Blankenship.
>> Judy Clark will be representing the CPSR and a few other organizations

Don't forget to bring a poster / banner representing any of the groups
you belong to.  I want to cover the conference room walls with a
display of all the various groups / people attending.  (Break out the
crayons and markers)

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++=

          DEF CON I CONVENTION  [PROPOSED SPEAKING SCHEDULE 5.08.1993]

             Saturday the 10th of July 10am, Sands Hotel, Las Vegas

         INTRODUCTION       Welcome to the convention
                            *The Dark Tangent (CON Organizer)

      Keynote speaker       Cyberspace, Society, crime and the future.

                            To hack or not to hack, that is not the question
                            *Ray Kaplan

   Civil Libertarians
                -CPSR       Computer Privacy/1st Amendment/Encryption
                            *Judy Clark

       -USC Comp. Law       Legalities of BBS Operation, message content
                            laws and network concerns.
                            *Allen Grogan, Editor of Computer Lawyer

     'The Underworld'
          -Networking       Concerns of National Networking
                            of CCi Net.
                            *Midnight Sorrow.

         Corporations
    -Packet Switching
               SPRINT       Concerns/security and the future
                  MCI       of packet switching.
                            (*Jim Black, MCI Systems Integrity)


            System 75       Common misbeliefs and rumors of the underground
                            *Scott Simpson

     -Virtual Reality       The law, and it's intersection with VR
                            *Karnow

-System Administrator       Security Concerns of an Administrator
                            *Terminus

     The 'Underworld'
            -Internet       The security problems with Internet/Networks
                            Overview of hacking
                            *Dark Druid

      -Getting Busted       The process of getting "busted"
                            *Count Zero

  -How to be a nobody       Hiding your identity in the high-tech future, or
                            The payphone is your friend.
                            *Anonymous

     -The Prosecutors       Their concerns/problems and
       Hacker Hunters       suggestions for the 'underworld'/Q&A

           -The Media       The effect of the media on public perceptions
                            *Erik Bloodaxe / Phrack Magazine

           CONCLUSION       General Q&A


This itinerary is proposed, and topics and speakers will be marked as
permanent once a confirmation is recieved.  This is by no means the exact
format of DEF CON I.  Any Questions / Comments Contact:

[e-mail]
Voice Mail 0-700-TANGENT
++++++++++++++++++++++++
Sorry for the huge signature, but I like privacy on sensitive matters.
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------------------------------

End of Computer Underground Digest #5.35
************************************